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Fish or Foul?
Will Aquaculture 
Carve Out a 
Niche in the 
Gulf of Maine?
by Philip W. Conkling
Despite early promise and an optimal environment, aqua-
culture has grown more slowly in Maine than it has in
other parts of the United States and the world. As Philip
Conkling explains, this is due to market forces, scientific
and technical issues, cultural opposition, and, more recent-
ly, the threat of an endangered species listing for Atlantic
salmon. While near-term prospects for significant expan-
sion of the industry appear bleak, Conkling suggests that 
a fresh generation of pioneers may be able to carve out a
new niche, but only by conducting “old fashioned” research
and development—on the job, on the water, and in local
communities along the coast. -
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The rationale for aquaculture in global terms is overwhelming. According to the United Nation’s
Food and Agriculture Organization estimates, more
than three-quarters of the world’s fisheries have
reached or exceeded their maximum sustainable yield
while the average per capita consumption of fish, espe-
cially in developed countries, continues to increase. 
Because wild fish harvests cannot meet the increas-
ing global demand for seafood, aquaculture production
continues to increase as a share of the fish that is con-
sumed worldwide. In the 1980s, aquaculture produc-
tion contributed a scant 10% of fish and shellfish
consumed worldwide. By the mid-1990s, that share
had grown to a quarter of worldwide fish consump-
tion, and that percentage is expected to double some-
time in the next decade. In the United States,
aquaculture is the fastest growing segment of the agri-
cultural sector, producing slightly less than $1 billion
of farm-raised fish and shellfish products. On the other
hand, we import over $14 billion in seafood products
from around the world, three-quarters of which are
produced through aquaculture. This value represents
the United States’ second largest natural resource-based
trade deficit, second only to oil.  
In the next decade, what role, if any, will Maine
coastal and offshore waters play in the expanding
aquaculture production in the United States? Although
none of us can see far into the future, the near-term
prospects for significant expansion of Maine’s aquacul-
ture industry appear bleak. The impending listing of
wild Atlantic salmon under the federal Endangered
Species Act directly targets current operational practices
of Maine’s salmon aquaculture industry, by far the
largest segment of the Maine aquaculture by volume
and value. Beyond the direct consequences of a federal
listing are inevitable indirect effects. The first citizen-
based lawsuits targeting salmon aquaculture operations
have already been filed, and there are likely to be more.
The lawsuits are fueled by a host of fears, including
concerns that beaches and marine environments around
fish farms are polluted by feces and farm wastes in an
unregulated manner. Other concerns center on fears
that farm-raised fish are fed hormones and antibiotics
that can upset the natural evolution of
wild species; and on fears that the fin
fish aquaculture industry is responsible
for allowing escaped farm-raised fish to
enter rivers where wild salmon spawn.
MAINE’S MARINE
ENVIRONMENTS
Maine’s saltwater environmentspotentially available for aquacul-
ture development are a natural endow-
ment of national significance. The state
enjoys an enormously long coastline
that is compressed into the 250 air
miles separating Kittery in the south-
west from Lubec at Maine’s eastern 
border with Canada. But within that
length are approximately 7,000 miles of
saltwater coastline which include 4,500
miles along mainland shores and anoth-
er 2,500 miles of island shorelines. 
The bays of Maine from Cobscook and
Machias in the east, down through Blue
Hill, Jericho and Penobscot in the 
midcoast to Casco and Saco bays in 
the western Gulf of Maine offer an
astounding variety of habitats with
varying temperature regimes, salinities,
nutrient conditions and degrees of
protection from storm events that can
wreak havoc with marine enterprises.
Currently, Maine’s aquaculture production 
consists of approximately $70 million worth of farm-
raised fish and shellfish. The vast majority of this 
value—over 90%—is produced by the state’s Atlantic
salmon farms. The remainder of Maine’s production
derives from small shellfish farms, many of which 
have specialized in oyster production. Maine’s salmon
farms have been concentrated in eastern Maine in
Cobscook, Machias, Pleasant and Narraguagus bays
while the shellfish industry has been concentrated in
the Damariscotta estuary. 
In the United
States, aquacul-
ture is the
fastest growing
segment of 
the agricultural 
sector, produc-
ing slightly less
than $1 billion
of farm-raised
fish and shellfish
products.
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EARLY PROMISE: THE EMERGENCE 
OF AQUACULTURE IN MAINE
Maine salmon farms gained a foothold in theEastport area in the mid-1980s for three reasons.
First, in the early 1980s the Canadian government
directly promoted and heavily invested in salmon aqua-
culture in Passamaquoddy Bay, New Brunswick, just
across the border from Eastport. In the early, heady
days of salmon aquaculture expansion in New
Brunswick, Maine entrepreneurs looked jealously across
the international boundary and quickly concluded that
the combination of growing conditions that seemed to
favor salmon production in New Brunswick also exist-
ed in Cobscook Bay. During the mid-1980s, before
salmon became a global commodity, salmon farmers
were able to market their product for upwards of $6
per pound, in comparison to approximately $2 per
pound today. At such prices, small fortunes could be
quickly made, and a multitude of mistakes or bad luck
in one year could be recouped from harvests in subse-
quent years. This, of course, is no longer the case.
A second important reason why the salmon indus-
try was able to expand in eastern Maine was that the
opposition to its existence came not from politically
powerful groups of summer residents and lobster fish-
ermen, as occurred in midcoast Maine, but from rela-
tively less active and less well-organized groups of
traditional fishermen. Scallop draggers and groundfish-
ermen, for instance, who opposed salmon aquaculture
in the Eastport area because it infringed on their fish-
ing activities, didn’t have the political clout of lobster-
men, and their industries were in the process of a slow
and painful shrinkage from a collapsing resource base
as aquaculture production increased in the early 1990s.
Finally, state regulators and government leaders
favored salmon aquaculture’s presence in eastern Maine
and helped promote its expansion throughout the
1990s. After decades of deeply entrenched unemploy-
ment in Washington County, the emergence and rapid
growth of salmon aquaculture there seemed to be a
godsend. The early salmon farms in Cobscook Bay
consisted of a handful of independent farmers who
would, it was hoped, reduce job losses and fishing
pressure on wild stocks while ushering in a new era 
of family-based salmon farms reliant on the region’s
nearly pristine waters. It sounded almost too good to
be true—and it was.
The state’s shellfish aquaculture industry emerged
in a different manner, and it is instructive to contrast 
its history and prospects with that of its larger “sister”
industry of fish farming in eastern Maine. The emer-
gence of shellfish aquaculture in Maine
derives almost entirely from one source:
the University of Maine’s Darling
Marine Center in Walpole on the east-
ern shore of the Damariscotta River
estuary. In 1965, a gift of land and
funds to build a marine laboratory for
the University of Maine led to the
establishment of a facility to provide instruction, exper-
tise and an “incubator” environment for a handful of
shellfish farmers who pioneered the industry in Maine.
University researchers teamed up with young entrepre-
neurs, primarily graduate students, to understand the
larval development of various species of clams, oysters
and mussels, and to develop production techniques 
suitable for the unique growing conditions found 
along the Maine coast. Throughout the following two
decades, a significant majority of all successful shellfish
farmers in Maine derived from the Darling Marine
Center’s program. 
REALITY SETS IN
In the early 1990s salmon prices entered into adecade-long period of a nearly irreversible price
declines. By 1990, the heady days of farm gate prices
In the early 1990s salmon prices entered into a decade-
long period of a nearly irreversible price declines.
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of $5-$6 a pound were already a distant memory.
Business models for new farms seeking financing were
based on the assumption of a new reality where prices
in the range of $3.50 per pound were projected. 
However, even these more realistic business models
had to be adjusted, often before the new salmon pro-
duction facilities could get up and running. By then,
large volumes of salmon from Norway and Scotland
had begun to depress prices in Maine and eastern
Canada. One of the immense challenges of salmon
farming operations results from the biological fact that
young salmon raised and fed in ocean net pens take an
average of eighteen months to reach marketable size.
The young salmon, called “smolt,” that are placed in
these net pens have already spent an additional eighteen
months in fresh water hatcheries before they are physi-
ologically ready for salt water. Add to this another year
at minimum for regulatory review and approval for
hatchery and grow-out sites, and it is quickly apparent
that integrated salmon production facilities take three
to four years of heavy, up-front investment before the
first dime is returned on that investment in sales.
During the first half of the 1990s, salmon prices
had slumped below $3 a pound for the first time, caus-
ing an initial round of bankruptcies and consolidations
to occur. The early dream of a salmon industry com-
posed of a large number of independent fish farmers
up and down the coast of Maine had been left behind
in the wake of increasing global competition.
Norway has long been the dominant player in
salmon technology development and it has dominated
world markets. As production increased from large
industrial facilities along Norway’s western coastline,
Norwegian salmon companies saturated European mar-
kets and began to aggressively market excess produc-
tion in the largest salmon market in the world, which is
found in the dense metropolitan belt between Boston
and Washington. 
The reaction from American salmon producers,
most of whom were located in Maine, was to initiate
an International Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding
alleging that Norwegian government subsidies to its
domestic salmon industry constituted unfair trade 
practices. The American producers sought a tariff on
Norwegian salmon imports. The ITC ruled in favor 
of American (Maine) salmon producers and imposed 
a tariff of 25% on Norwegian salmon. Be careful 
of what you wish. 
The jubilation of Maine salmon farmers expecting
to see salmon prices stabilize in the range of $3 per
pound, allowing them to remain competitive, was short
lived. The virtual exclusion of Norwegian salmon from
the large and expanding American markets resulted 
not in increased opportunity and profits for Maine (and
Canadian) salmon growers—but instead, an opening
for a new competitor that had burst onto the world scene.
Salmon had become such a valuable global com-
modity that large multinational corporations had taken
notice, including companies such as BP (the old British
Petroleum) that were looking to diversify into new
businesses. Salmon—especially Atlantic salmon that 
are more highly favored in the market than sea-ranched
Pacific salmon—cannot be raised just anywhere, 
but one area of immense potential exists along the
immensely long, island-protected shoreline of Chile.
The multinationals that had moved into business-
friendly Chilean waters—expecting to export their
salmon to Japan—had just scaled up their production
in the mid-1990s. The ITC ruling gave them a golden
opportunity to enter the U.S. market. By 1995, salmon
prices had drifted back down between $2.00 and
$2.50 per pound as Chilean salmon flooded into
American markets. And the bottom was not in sight.
Meanwhile, shellfish farmers had experienced little
of the growth and intense competition that had both
benefited and afflicted the salmon industry. Shellfish
aquaculture has always benefited from high demand
and high prices for its production, but technical hurdles
from shellfish diseases and predation have literally
plagued this sector of the industry. Shellfish farmers in
Maine have had important and valuable niches in their
respective markets, but have generally been unable to
scale up production to become a dominant force even
in local areas. 
The only large shellfish aquaculture company—
Great Eastern Mussel—had disappointing results in
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“bottom culture,” where seed mussels dredged from
shallow waters are scattered at controlled densities to
grow out on bottom leases. To begin with, mussel 
leases were notoriously difficult for Great Eastern to
acquire. Great Eastern’s strategy was to develop local
partners that would submit applications for leases, then
acquire seeds from Great Eastern and sell the bottom-
cultured product to Great Eastern one-and-a-half or
two years later. But contract mussel growers were reluc-
tant to invest their time and resources in developing
lease sites and then be required to sell their product to
only one market for processing. Particularly Downeast,
growers are wary of making themselves dependent on
one “big corporation.” 
Great Eastern also faced local opposition. The idea
of “fencing off ” the ocean commons for the benefit 
of private companies ran directly into the buzz saw 
of the prevailing political philosophy of most Maine
fishermen—the waters are for the benefit of everyone,
or at least of anyone who has the pluck to defend indi-
vidual territory against outside depredation. Besides,
the tradition had always been that most important
marine resource allocation issues, certainly in the lob-
ster fishery, were decided informally at the local level
and not through complicated state adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. Repeated lease applications submitted by
Great Eastern throughout the 1980s were invariably
greeted by intense local opposition. When some appli-
cations were granted, opponents responded by going 
to the Maine Legislature to argue for changes in
Maine’s aquaculture law. The result of those appeals
was to increase the regulatory hurdles aquaculture lease
applicants had to surmount, which were generally 
discouraging to new or would-be entrants into any
aquaculture operation.
Certainly another part of the disappointment for
the shellfish aquaculture sector resulted from an unfor-
tunate change in priorities at the University of Maine’s
Darling Center. The University found it difficult to
manage this distant branch, located far from the Orono
campus. In the early 1990s parts of the Darling Center
program and staff were relocated to Orono and other
parts gradually went downhill until resignations and
retirements had emptied the Center of its earlier talent
and resources to support shellfish aquaculture enterpris-
es. To be sure, the Darling Center reinvented itself as 
a center for summer research attracting many nationally
and internationally recognized experts, but from the
aquaculture industry point of view, the change in pro-
gram focus was a large disappointment. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As the 1990s drew to a close, the salmon aquacul-ture industry went through several more rounds of
consolidation as the pace of global competition among
multinational organizations continued to increase.
Salmon prices hovered around $2 per pound, certainly
a boon for consumers, but at a cost of continued con-
solidation in the industry. Recently, prices have firmed 
a bit into the range of $2.50 per pound.
It is interesting and symptomatic that the vertical
integration of ocean grow-out sites with fresh water
hatchery facilities had gone a step further upstream.
Several of the largest players in salmon aquaculture are
now the feed companies that have acquired both hatch-
ery and production facilities. They can, in effect, decide
on a year-to-year basis where to make their profit in an
environment of steadily shrinking margins. As prices
continue to soften, hatcheries have been forced to sell
smolt at lower and lower prices. As hatcheries have
become less profitable, profits can still be made by 
selling feed. But the feed companies need the farmers
to stay in business if they are to have customers, so
investors have begun to acquire the feed companies 
as well as the hatcheries and the farms themselves. 
Recently, Maine’s salmon industry mounted 
another international trade case, this time against Chile
alleging that Chilean salmon producers were dumping
salmon in U.S. markets at prices below their production
costs. The case was resolved in favor of Maine salmon
growers, resulting in an excise tax of 4.5% levied 
on imported Chilean salmon. It may not have leveled
the international competitive playing field for Maine
salmon producers, but the resolution of this second
case brought in a general firming of prices and just
enough breathing room for production to begin increas-
ing from Maine’s salmon farms by the late 1990s. 
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ENDANGERED SPECIES
Just as the global economic picture brightened forMaine salmon producers, the industry was under
pressure again from a new threat. During the past year,
the United States Department of the Interior has 
signaled its intention to list the Atlantic salmon popula-
tion in seven Maine rivers as threatened under the
Endangered Species Act. Many individual salmon runs
in Maine rivers, where the fish were once abundant,
have long since gone extinct as distinct population 
segments. Their disappearance is the legacy of a centu-
ry of dam blockages, habitat destruction and pollution.
But the federal government contends that salmon runs
in the seven rivers, primarily in eastern Maine, represent
genetically recognizable distinct population segments,
and that their numbers have declined to such low 
levels that a federal listing is advisable. It is unlikely 
to occur this year.
The governor of the state of Maine, along with
most of the salmon industry, has challenged the pro-
posed listing on both scientific and economic grounds.
The state’s official position is that the existence of
seven distinct population units in the rivers in question
is factually incorrect. The gene pool of the salmon in
these rivers, the argument goes, has been modified 
by decades of stocking by federal managers from 
non-river specific salmon. Thus, no “pure” fish remain. 
On economic grounds, the industry argues that 
business conditions are already so marginal that the
additional regulatory burdens that would attend
Endangered Species Act designation would drive the
industry out of Maine to invest in other regions, where
environmental regulation is less stringent.
The Department of the Interior, which is responsi-
ble for enforcing the Endangered Species Act, is under
pressure from a lawsuit filed by several large national
and regional environmental groups, all of whom are
contending that salmon runs have declined to critically
low levels over a period of several decades.
According to official pronouncements from the
Maine Aquaculture Association, the future for large-
scale salmon aquaculture in Maine will be significantly
influenced by the pending cases over
whether an Endangered Species Act
designation is biologically or genetically
defensible. Parenthetically, many
knowledgeable experts believe that,
aside from what the ultimate decision
over listing is, Atlantic salmon are in
decline for reasons that have less to do
with the threats posed by salmon aqua-
culture than the disappearance of adult
salmon on their winter feeding grounds.
Whether Atlantic salmon, when they
leave Maine rivers, are dying as a result
of unregulated high seas fishing, or
from habitat changes potentially associ-
ated with global warming and the con-
sequent shift of their prey species to
other regions, no one really knows.
It is undeniable that the multina-
tional corporations that are the back-
bone of the industry are capable of
moving their capital assets from region
to region, depending on business con-
ditions. It is also true that corporate
public relations campaigns are capable of overstating
the threats of government regulation and that they 
can learn to live with a listing under the Endangered
Species Act.
Changes in operating procedures would be
required, but whether these would be so draconian 
as to make salmon production uneconomical would
depend on the details of what changes actually would
be required. More likely than the salmon aquaculture
companies packing up and moving elsewhere is that
Maine operations would suffer from a decline in new
investment in expanded operations, relative to other
areas, given the uncertainty associated with what addi-
tional regulations might be imposed.
To add to the salmon aquaculture woes, a local
environmental group, Friends of Blue Hill Bay, has
recently filed a notice of intent to sue a salmon grower
and the Environmental Protection Agency for failing 
to acquire a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
Just as the 
global economic
picture bright-
ened for Maine
salmon produc-
ers, the industry
was under pres-
sure again from
a new threat.
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System permit required under the federal Clean Water
Act for point sources of pollution.
CULTURAL OPPOSITION 
Beyond the market and regulatory hurdles faced by the aquaculture industry is a deeply rooted
opposition to the whole idea of transforming the
Maine coast away from traditional fisheries and toward
a more “rational” use of the waters for controlled
modes of production. In some senses this cultural
opposition to aquaculture is like an ancient confronta-
tion between a fishing culture based on “hunting and
gathering” and a culture based on tending crops in an
agricultural setting. The fact is that despite severe
downturns in coastal fisheries, very few fishermen have
shifted into aquaculture. The new entrants into aqua-
culture have come mostly from the ranks of the college
educated, who believe they will be able to transform
their technical training and expertise into a viable and
profitable living. By and large, the school of hard
knocks has not produced aquaculture entrepreneurs.
Fishermen, especially lobstermen who are politically
active and astute, see no reason to cede traditional local
control over fishing territories governed by complex
kinship and local relations to state and federal bureau-
crats wanting to make room for aquaculture to diversify
local economies. In this cultural opposition to aquacul-
ture, traditional fishermen are joined by another power-
ful group—summer shorefront property owners. Many
people who are attracted to Maine’s scenic beauty and
the immense recreational boating opportunities—and
who have spent small fortunes to acquire such assets—
are often supremely disinterested in seeing state and
federal authorities award exclusive rights to the water
column for new “industrial” uses. Although the state
legislature and regulatory agencies have not been par-
ticularly fertile ground for opposition from summer res-
idents, the courts have been a remedy of last resort.
Many aquaculture leases have either been overturned
by the courts or stalled to the point of
discouraging further investment from entrepreneurs.
THE FUTURE
Does aquaculture have a future on the Maine coast?The jury is still out. Despite the abundance of
pristine sites along the Maine coast, aquaculture has
grown more slowly here than in many other regions 
of the United States and other countries. The most
fundamental reason for the skepticism, if not outright
hostility to aquaculture in many towns and harbors
along the Maine coast, may result from the fact that the
laws regulating its development are administered by
state and federal agencies. Local residents are perennial-
ly surprised when the fine print of a legal notice is
filed in a town newspaper announcing an aqua-
culture lease hearing for a site in town waters.
Because many other activities relating to the use
of local harbors and waters are governed locally,
a state proceeding immediately tends to put local
government officials, fishermen, conservationists
and other concerned citizens on the defensive.
They react by organizing “David vs. Goliath”
campaigns and are often successful in driving off the
outside invader.
In such an atmosphere it is difficult for a proposed
aquaculture operation to get its case across effectively in
the court of public opinion. Maine’s aquaculture statute
does require that local harbormasters be notified and
approve of a site application, but often the purview of
a harbormaster does not extend beyond the immediate
bounds of the moorings in a harbor. Many successful
aquaculture applications have been preceded by intense
local outreach to local selectmen, planning boards, fish-
ermen and riparian owners. Such an effort is not
required under law, but has been a successful strategy
to blunt opposition before it is mobilized by meeting
with concerned local residents and modifying the pro-
posal before everyone gets locked into a pitched battle
from which retreat is difficult. 
…despite severe downturns in coastal fisheries,
very few fishermen have shifted into aquaculture.
Fall 2000 ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  19
FISH OR FOUL
This article has pointed out many of the daunting
hurdles that loom in the path of salmon aquaculture
enterprises that need to expand their operations on the
Maine coast if they are to remain globally competitive.
Having covered the problems, it is important to high-
light the fact that salmon aquaculture is the most 
technically advanced form of aquaculture currently
practiced anywhere in the world. The technology
depends on local access to large volumes of fresh water
for hatchery operations and access to pristine waters for
ocean grow-out. Only three states in the United States
have the necessary biological conditions for salmon
aquaculture: Alaska, Washington and Maine. Alaska 
has banned salmon net pen aquaculture as incompatible
with maintaining their river stocking programs.
Washington State has de facto stopped salmon aquacul-
ture from expanding in Puget Sound as a result of
conflicts with riparian owners and environmentalists.
This leaves Maine as the one viable alternative left for 
a domestic industry. If Maine is unable to approve
additional salmon lease applications along the coast,
this will be tragic for the state’s aquaculture interests 
in the long run.
Even though the picture for corporate fish farming
is fraught with difficult challenges, the picture for 
shellfish aquaculture may be brighter. Maine recently
amended its aquaculture law to create a new leasing
process for experimental operations of less than two
acres. More than fifty new leases have been applied for
under this designation, virtually all of them proposing
to raise one or more species of shellfish. This surge 
in lease applications demonstrates that watermen and
entrepreneurs are still interested in expanding aquacul-
tural enterprises and opportunities. Many of these 
new enterprises will not, of course, be successful, but
the potential for innovation is substantial and some 
will likely be able to scale up into significant operations
in the future. 
If technical hurdles can be overcome, the
prospects for shellfish aquaculture may also be brighter
because they are less capital intensive in their start-up
phases, although the shellfish industry suffers from a
low critical mass and from at least a decade’s worth 
of lack of investment in research and development to
understand the basic biology of many of the species
that are of interest. Still, aqua-
culture degree programs are
growing at both the University
of Maine and at private col-
leges, and the idea of an
owner-operator type of enter-
prise working along the Maine
coast has very deep historic and 
cultural roots.
If there is reason for 
optimism that aquaculture will
carve out new niches in Maine
in the near future, it is because 
a new generation of pioneers 
is doing the required research
and development the old-fash-
ioned way—on the job and on
the water in local communities
in one-on-one conversations.
This may not be the best way
to grow an industry quickly, but
given the deeply rooted history
and political philosophy in-
grained in countless towns and
fishing villages along the coast, 
it may be the only way.   -
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